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Language and History 
in Benjamin 
Giorgio Agamben 
Among the preparatory notes for Walter Benjamin's Theses 
on the Philosophy of History, the following is repeated in various 
forms: 
The Messianic world is the world of a total and integral actuality . 
The first instance of universal history occurs there . Today this term 
can only denote a type of esperanto which cannot be realized until 
the confusion of Babel is cleared up. It presupposes a language 
into which every text can be wholly translated, whether it is written 
in a living or a dead tongue. Or rather, it is itself this language; 
not in written form, but as it is joyously acted out. This celebration 
is purified of all rite or song, and its language is the very idea of 
a universally comprehended prose, just as the language of birds is 
comprehended by the children born on Sunday. 1 
At first this messianic conflation of language and history, of 
linguistic and historical categories, may seem surprising. Benjamin 
writes that the history of redeemed humanity is the only universal 
history; but it is one and the same with its language. Universal 
Published in Walter Benjamin. Tempo storia linguaggio. Eds. Lucio 
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history presupposes-in fact it constitutes-a universal language 
which puts an end to the confusion of tongues. The figure of this 
language of redeemed humanity is not written, but joyously celeb-
rated. It is the idea of prose. "Liberated prose," as we read in one 
version, "which has broken free of the chains of writing, "2 and 
it is embraced by all men as, according to a popular Christian 
legend, the Sonntagskinder, children born on Sunday, are able to 
understand the language of birds through supernatural powers. 
In the following pages we will offer a reading of this text in 
which Benjamin, during an inspired period, shaped one of his 
most profound arguments. 
The conflation of historic and linguistic categories in question 
here was not always as unusual as it may seem to the modern 
reader. During the Middle Ages this notion was formulated in 
even more radical terms: "History pertains to grammar" (haec dis-
ciplina scil. historia, we find in the Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, ad 
gramaticam pertinet). 3 In the writings of Augustine, where Isidore's 
ftatement found its proper authority, this pertinence is explained 
in terms of the necessary reference of every historical process of 
handing down [tramandamento] to the domain of the "letter." After 
having passed through the "infancy of grammar" (quaedam 
gramaticae infantia), from the invention of alphabetic characters to 
the identification of the parts of discourse, Augustine continues: 
Thus grammar was completed, but since within its very name it 
declared itself an expression of letters, since it is called in Latin, 
literature, it happened that whenever something memorable was 
to be written down (litteris mandaretur), it necessarily pertained to 
grammar. Grammar was thus linked to history, a discipline with 
one name but infinite content, manifold and full of more sorrow 
than joy or truth, a ponderous affair not so much for historians 
but for grammarians. 4 
If history is presented here in a conventionally gloomy light, 
as a "ponderous affair for grammarians more than for historians," 
this is because Augustine, with his acute penetration of the nature 
of language, defines grammar not only in the strict sense (the 
synchronic analysis of structures), but also in terms of the infinite 
dimension of historical transmittal (litteris mandaretur). The letter, 
the gram, is for Augustine, before all else, an historical element. 
But in what sense? 
The Augustinian conception had its foundation in the histor-
ical reflection on language as it was still expressed, for example, 
in Varro's great treatise on the Latin language. This tradition 
clearly distinguished two fields within language: names ( or pure 
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denomination, impositio, quemadmodum vocabula rebus essent im-
posita), and discourse, which derives from the first category as "a 
river from a spring. "5 
Because man can only receive the names which proceed him 
in this process of handing down, access to the foundation of 
language is mediated and conditioned by history. Speaking man 
does not invent words, nor do they emit from him like an animal 
voice: they come down to him, as Varro says, descending, that is 
within an historical process of handing down. Names can only 
be given over, betrayed [traditi]; the speech act is the object of an 
ars, subject to a technical, rational knowledge. It is of no impor-
tance here whether names are conceived as a divine gift or a 
human invention. What is significant is that in every case, the 
origin of names escapes the speaker. 
With this decomposition of the linguistic field into two hierar-
chically distinct levels, we find ourselves in the presence of a 
theory which is so durable and central that it reappears in perfectly 
analogous terms in Wittgenstein's Tractatus . Here names are in 
fact defined as primitive signs (Urzeichen), whose significance must 
be explained before we can understand them . 6 With propositions, 
on the other hand, understanding is achieved without preliminary 
explanation. (We ought to note that here the character of the 
human access to language is such that each speech act always 
presupposes a field of names only penetrable historically, in a "it 
is said this way" which is actually a "it was said this way.") . 
And this primarily historical foundation oflanguage, resisting 
any purely technical, rational penetration, is expressed in a passage 
from Dante's Convivio through an astronomical simile, as the 
"shadow" of grammar. Here, Dante compares grammar with the 
sphere of the moon, because of "the shadow which is in it, which 
is nothing else but the scattered and vaporous materials of its 
body, where the rays of the sun cannot penetrate or be reflected 
as they can in other parts." Likewise, Dante says of grammar, 
"because of its infinity, the rays of reason cannot reach it, and 
this is especially true for words." 7 
Reason cannot be the base names (Ii vocaboli), and it cannot 
carry them through because, as we have seen, names come to 
Reason historically, descending . This infinite "descent" of names 
is history. Language always anticipates this, and we need only 
consider speaking man at his origin, carving it out from the infinite 
towards the past, and at the same time, towards the future of an 
infinite descension such that thought can never end in language. 
And this is the immedicable "shadow" of grammar, of obscurity 
inherent in language at its origins and which provides the founda-
tion-in the necessary coincidence of history and grammar-for 
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the historicity of man. History is the figure of the shadow which 
veils human access to the field of names: history is in lieu of 
names . The transparency of language, the groundlessness of every 
speech act, is the basis for both theology and history. As long as 
man has no access to the foundation of language, there will be a 
handing down of names; and as long as there is a handing down, 
there will be history and destiny. 
The coincidence of language and history, which emerges in 
Benjamin, ceases, in this light, to appear surprising. Man's histor-
ical condition is inseparable from his condition as speaker, and is 
inscribed in the very modality of his access to language, originally 
signaled by a split. But how does Benjamin construe this cohesion 
of language and history, of linguistic and historical categories? In 
a text from 1916 (The Significance of Language in the Trauerspiel and 
Tragedy), the cohesion is expressed in a flagrant abbreviation: "His-
tory," we find here, "is born simultaneously with meaning in 
human language." 8 In this piece, suddenly, the cohesion of lan-
guage and history is not total: in fact, it coincides with a split on 
the linguistic level, that is, with the falling out of the word (Wort) 
from its "pure sentimental life" (reines Gefuhlsleben) in which it 
exists as the "pure sound of sentiment," to the sphere of meaning 
(Bedeutung): "in the middle of this journey [towards pure sound] 
nature sees itself betrayed by language, and this immense inhibi-
tion of sentiment becomes an act of mourning. "9 History and 
meaning produce each other, but they arise from a so-called pre-
historic condition of language, one in which the dimension of 
meaning has not yet emerged, but which amounts to the purely 
sentimental life of the word. 
In the essay On Language in General and the Language of Men 
(1916), the decomposition of language into two fields is clearly 
articulated in a mythologem founded on biblical exegesis. Here, 
as in Medieval thought, the original field of language is that of 
names, exemplified, however, according to the story of Genesis, 
in Adamic denomination. What Benjamin terms here "pure lan-
guage" (reine Sprache) or the language of names (Namenssprache) 
is not, however, what we, according to an increasingly more dif-
fuse conception, are accustomed to consider as a language: that 
is, the signifying word, as a means of communication which trans-
mits a message from one subject to another. Such a definition is ex-
plicitly refuted by Benjamin as a "bourgeois concept of language," 
whose "inconsistency and emptiness" he means to demonstrate. 
Faced with this, the pure language of names stands as an example 
of a concept of language which "knows no means, no object, no 
addressee of communication." The name, as "the most intimate 
essence of language itself," is that "through which nothing is 
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communicated and in which language C0mmunicates itself abso-
lutely." In the name, the spiritual essence which communicates 
itself is language. Because of this, Benjamin can still define the 
name as "the language of language (where the genitive does not 
express the means but the medium). 1110 
The status of this Adamic language is, therefore, that of a 
word which communicates nothing beyond itself, and in which, 
therefore, spiritual essence and linguistic essence coincide. Such 
a language, in fact, has no content, it does not communicate objects 
through signifieds, but rather it is perfectly transparent with regard 
to itself: "Language has no content. As communication, language 
conveys a spiritual being, that is, a communicability pure and 
simple." 11 Because of this, in pure language, the problem of the 
unsayable which characterizes human language does not exist (as 
"contrast between the uttered and the utterable on one hand, and 
the unsayable and the unuttered on the other" 12). Here, 
philosophy of language has its point of contact with religion in 
the concept of revelation, which does not know the unsayable. 
The original sin which banished man from the Garden is, 
before all else, the fall from this perfectly transparent language of 
nonsignifying names to the signifying word as a means of exterior 
communication: "The word should communicate something 
beyond itself," writes Benjamin. In fact, 
This is the original sin of the linguistic spirit . Inasmuch as man 
leaves behind the pure language of names, he makes of language 
a means (from an inadequate knowledge), and thus also, at least in 
part, a mere sign: and later this results in the confusion of tongues. 13 
It is this fallen condition of language, ratified by the Babelic 
confusion of tongues, which the essay of 1921 on the Work of the 
Translator presents in the perspective of messianic redemption. 
Here, the multiplicity of historical languages is captured in its 
tension with that pure language which the essay of 1916 presented 
as the paradisiacal origin and which now appears as the sole 
agreed upon meaning for all languages. "Every overarching tie 
between languages," Benjamin writes, 
consists in the fact that for each individual instance, taken as a 
total entity, one unique thing is understood . But this thing is not 
accessible in any one of the individual languages, only in the totality 
of their meanings which become fused together as pure language. 14 
This integrated unity remains, within individual languages, as a 
potential waiting to harmonize with all languages in that which 
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Benjamin terms the "messianic end of their history." Just as history 
moves towards its messianic fulfillment, so the linguistic move-
ment as a whole moves towards "the final stage, definitive and 
decisive, of every linguistic structure." 15 The work of the 
philosopher, like that of the translator, is in fact this "description" 
and the "premonition" of this one true language which attempts 
to "expose itself" and to "constitute itself" in the development of 
languages. At the end of the essay, this pure language is decisively 
figured as a "word without expression," which is liberated from 
the weight and the alienation of sense: 
To free it from sense, to make the symbolized from the symbolizing 
itself, to reobtain the pure language forged from linguistic move-
ment, this is the single and powerful capacity of translation. In this 
pure language, which no longer means anything (nichts mehr meint) 
and no longer explains anything (nicht mehr ausdruckt), but which, 
as an expressionless and generative word, is the agreed upon mean-
ing-in this language all communication, all sense and all intention-
ality reach a sphere in which they are destined to extinguish 
themselves. 16 
How are we to understand this "inexpressive word," this 
pure language in which all communication and all sense are extin-
guished? How can we conceive of-because this and nothing less 
than this is the problem at this point in our thought-a word 
which no longer means, which no longer is destined for the his-
torical handing down of a signified? And in what sense does this 
word-which necessarily cancels out the Babelic confusion of 
tongues-provide us with a model of a universal language of 
redeemed humanity which "is immediately understood by all men 
as the language of birds is understood by the children born on 
Sunday"? How can man speak purely, how can he understand 
the word, without the mediation of the signified? 
All historical languages, Benjamin writes, mean [vogliono dire] 
pure language. It is the common sense (das Gemeinte), that which 
is meant in every language. But by itself it means nothing; in it, 
all sense and intentionality cease. We could say that all languages 
want to say the word which does not mean [ vogliono dire la parola che 
non vuole dire]. 
Let us try to penetrate the paradox of this formulation of 
meaning. Benjamin states that "in each language taken as an en-
tity, only one thing is understood, and this is not accessible in 
any of them by themselves, but only in the totality of their mean-
ings when fused together." 17 That which remains unsayable and 
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unsaid in every language is, therefore, exactly that which it means 
and intends to say: the pure language, the inexpressive word. It 
is precisely this persistent unsaid of meaning which sustains, at 
the base, the significant tension between languages and their 
historical evolution. The field of names-whose distinction from 
discourse we saw as inaugurating the cohesion of history and 
language-is the meaning which languages hand down without 
ever succeeding in bringing it as such into speech: it is (and this 
is how the biblical myth of the fall of Edenic language should be 
understood) that which destines the various languages to their 
historical development. They signify, they have sense, because 
they mean [vogliono dire]; but what they mean-pure language-
remains unsaid within them. 
And so the relationship between the various historical lan-
guages and their one common feature remains dialectical: in order 
for the languages to express this point of intersection they would 
have to cease meaning to say it, that is, to hand themselves down 
in meaning: but this is exactly what they cannot do-at least not 
to the point of abolishing themselves-because this capacity is 
only accessible to the totality of linguistic meanings, that is, to 
their messianic end. Benjamin writes that "a solution, other than 
one which is temporary and contingent [ on the estrangement of 
languages], an instantaneous and definitive solution to this es-
trangement, is prohibited to men, and is not, in any case, obtain-
able for the moment." 18 This does not imply an infinite dialectic. 
Through mediation (as Benjamin wrote of religion, "the hidden 
seed of a higher language is germinating in the languages") this 
task is possible and realizable. The inexpressive, universal lan-
guage is "constituting" itself and "exposing" itself in the historical 
evolution of languages. This constitution, however, definitively 
extinguishes every linguistic meaning and eliminates the unsay-
able which destined it to historicity, and to signification. Inasmuch 
as the pure language is the only one which does not mean, but 
says, it is also the only one in which that "crystalline elimination 
of the unsayable in language," which Benjamin invokes in a letter 
to Buber of 1916, can be realized. It is truly the "language of 
language," which saves meaning in all languages. In its trans-
parency, language can finally declare itself. 
Now that we have noted the physiognomic characteristics of 
pure language, regardless of how paradoxical they may appear, 
how are we to represent them in relation to our initial proposition, 
concerning the universal language of messianic humanity? 
Let us first attempt to construe this language according to a 
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hypothesis which Benjamin explicitly excludes, that is, as a sort 
of esperanto. The fact that esperanto expressed a messianic inten-
tion, even in its name, could not have escaped Benjamin (who, 
in one of the preparatory notes for the Theses on the Concept of 
History, writes that "universal history in its contemporary sense 
is always a sort of esperanto. It expresses the hopes of the human 
species just as well as the name of this universal language" 19 ). In 
fact, the term "esperanto" signifies one who hopes, and it is the 
pseudonym under which the Polish-Jewish doctor Ludwig 
Zamenhof published his Lingvo Internacia in 1887, an exposition 
of the fundamentals of a universal language in which the author 
placed his hopes for an eternal and universal understanding be-
tween all people. The fact that he presented his language in mes-
sianic terms (that is, to use Benjamin's words, as a language "into 
which every text can be wholly translated, whether it is written 
in a living or a dead tongue") proceeded from his tenacious trans-
lation work, which culminated in the esperanto version of the 
Old Testament, published posthumously in London in 1926 (the 
same year in which Rosenzweig, along with Buber, was working 
out his German translation of the Bible). 
How is esperanto constructed? It is founded on 4,413 roots 
culled from Inda-European languages (neo-Latin, for the most 
part), which form substantives with the suffix -o, adjectives with 
-a, and verbal infinitives with -i. From skrib, which indicates writ-
ing, esperanto has skribo (a writer), skriba (writerly), and skribi (to 
write). In other words, the grammatical simplification and regulari-
zation of historical languages which leaves unchanged the funda-
mental conception of language as a system of signs centering 
around signifieds. A given term, it is true, may be situated in the 
plurality of languages, but not in terms of a messianic end or 
transfiguration, so much as in the sense of their infinite conserva-
tion of signification and meaning [voler dire]. It is enough to reflect 
for an instant to realize that here it is precisely the messianic end 
of languages which Benjamin proposed which is excluded: es-
peranto is an infinite meaning [voler dire] which finds no end. Any 
concept of universal history which had esperanto as its model 
could only be a summarial organization of the essential elements 
of all particular histories; this summary would not be the world 
of an integral actuality liberated from writing, but writing relegated 
to an infinite handing down. 
Another interpretation towards which Benjamin was explicity 
hostile is one which conceives of universal language ( or history) 
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as an "ideal," in the sense of an infinite duty which crosses all 
historical evolution. The inexpressive word would be an infinite 
task (and, as such, is never fulfilled), towards which the historical 
experience of speaking man is moving. One such attitude (which 
only falsely can be termed religious) with regard to language and 
to the historical tradition is affirmed today by a philosophical 
current, developing from an interpretation of Heidegger as it is 
linked to traditional Anglo-Saxon analytic thought, which has 
gained in stature in the contemporary academic koine. 
According to this conception, 
every speech act, as it occurs, also renders present the unsaid to 
which it refers as response and call. All human discourse is finite, 
in the sense that in it there is always an infinity of meaning to 
develop and interpret. 20 
This infinity of meaning is that to which ever act of listening must 
be attentive: authentic interpretation is that which, leaving open 
the infinite historical community of messages, situates each histor-
ical utterance in the unsaid which is destined for infinite interpre-
tation. Any interpreter who chooses not to maintain the infinity 
of historical tradition would appear, in the words of Gadamer, as 
"a dog to whom someone is trying to indicate something, and 
who inevitably bites the hand that feeds it information instead of 
looking in the direction indicated." Benjamin explicitly turned 
against such a perspective when he grouped together the social 
democratic transformation of a Marxist ideal of a classless society 
(which was for him genuinely messianic) into a never-ending task, 
with an analogous transformation, conceived by neo-Kantianism, 
of the Kantian idea into an ideal. Just as the classless society here 
becomes the foundation and guide of all historical change without 
ever being actually realized, so the ideal language becomes-in the 
hermeneutic perspectjve-the unutterable foundation which con-
trols the destiny of the interminable linguistic movement without 
ever reaching the level of the word. "A classless society," Benjamin 
suggested rather, "is not the final scope of historical progress, but 
its interruption, so often missed and finally fulfilled. "21 
True textual hermeneutics is, for Benjamin, the exact opposite 
of what is proposed by contemporary hermeneutics: if the interpre-
ter looks to the unsaid and the infinity of meaning it is certainly 
not in order to conserve them but in order to fulfill them, to finish 
them off. Like the dog in Gadamer's example, the interpreter 
obstinately bites the hand of the historic moment because, in an 
infinite returning, it ceases to indicate beyond itself . Authentic 
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criticism is the end and mortification of the work: explaining the 
idea, criticism strips the work to the bone, it dazzles it, it tells it. 
The mystical basis of this conception of language and history 
becomes evident in another theory which Benjamin legitimates: 
that ancient cabalistic theory of language which, in our time, has 
found its most authoritative exposition in the work of Scholem. 
According to this idea, the Name of God is the foundation of all 
human language. This name does not contain, however, its own 
sense nor is it utterable; in fact, it is constituted by the twenty 
two-letters of the alphabet, which combine to form all of the lan-
guages of man. 
"This name," writes Scholem, 
makes no sense to the Cabalists in its common form, it has no 
concrete meaning. The lack of significance of the name of God 
indicates its position as the foundation and center of revelation. 
Behind every revelation of meaning in language ... stands this 
element which dominates and makes meaning possible, and which, 
without meaning itself, assigns all meaning. That which addresses 
creation and revelation, the word of God, is infinitely interpretable 
and is reflected within our language. Its rays and sounds which 
we intercept are not communications but callings. What is signified, 
what has form and meaning is not this word itself, but the tradition 
of this word, its mediation and reflection in time. 22 
With this mystical conception of the relationship between the 
"literal" name of God and human language, we enter a horizon of 
thought which was clearly familiar to Benjamin and which today 
has been secularized in the theory of the supremacy of the letter or 
the gram (as the originary negative foundation of language) which, 
stemming from Derrida, has seen numerous applications in con-
temporary French thought. While the mystical and insignificant 
character of the name of God is linked to its constitution by pure 
letters in the Cabala as well as in its grammatological version, 
Benjamin explicitly affirms that the language of redeemed human-
ity has "broken the chains of writing" and is a language "not 
written, but joyously acted out." To the "writing of what has 
never been said" of the cabalistic method, Benjamin here proposes 
a "reading of what has never been written." If the letters which 
form the unpronounceable name of God are those which commit 
human language to an historical handing down and an infinite 
interpretation, then we can suppose (according to a notion which 
Benjamin once had of comparing his relationship to theology with 
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the relationship between absorbent paper and ink: "It [the paper] 
is completely saturated. But if the paper had any say, there would 
be no more ink.") that the universal language represents rather 
the definitive cancellation and resolution of human language, the 
name of God definitively and absolutely expressed in words. 
With the exclusion of these three hypotheses, we have de-
lineated, even if by process of elimination, some other physio-
gnomic trait of pure language, though clearly not its entire form. 
And yet what was at stake, for Benjamin, was something like the 
supreme problem of thought. This is made evident by the fact 
that in the "Epistemo-Critical Prologue" to The Origin of German 
Tragic Drama he strictly links the pure language of Adamic names 
with the Platonic theory of ideas: 
Ideas are something linquistic (ein Sprachliches) and precisely in the 
essence of the word every time it is the moment when the word 
becomes a symbol. In empirical perception when words are split 
up, a manifestly profane significance inserts itself beside their more 
or less hidden symbolic aspect. It is up to philosophers, through 
exposition, to restore the symbolic character of the word to its pre-
eminence, where the idea reaches its self-sufficient meaning which 
is the opposite of all direct communication with the outside ... in 
philosophic contemplation the idea loosens itself from the intimacy 
with reality, as the word regains its denominative power. 23 
And it is precisely the pure denominative power "not lost in cog-
nitive significance" which, in the passage immediately following, 
constitutes Adam, along with Plato, as the true father of 
philosophy. 
The comprehension of the status of names becomes, at this 
point, as essential, but also as aporetic, as the comprehension of 
the status of ideas in Plato's Parmenides (those ideas which Plato 
says were born precisely from a search into the logoi, the words). 
Do names, like ideas with respect to phenomena, exist as reality 
in themselves, separate (xwpL<;) with respect to existing words? Is 
there a separation (xwpLcrµcr<;) between the one and the other? Or 
rather-as in the relationship between ideas and phenomena-is 
the supreme task of thought to construe the relationship (not the 
xwpucrµcr<;, the separation, but the xwpa, the region) between the 
language of names and human language? Because once again, 
explicitly from the capacity to construe this relationship, the ques-
tion is raised whether the language of names and the universal 
language should be conceived as an unreachable origin and an 
infinite task, or whether, on the other hand, the effective construe-
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tion of this relation, of this region, becomes the task of the 
philosopher as translator, of the historian as critic, and finally the 
ethical responsibility of every speaking person. 
In the "Epistemo-Critical Prologue," the exposition of the idea 
in phenomena is inseparable from the salvation of phenomena in 
the idea: the two interpenetrate in a single gesture. "The exposition 
of phenomena," Benjamin writes, "is also that of ideas, and only 
here whatever is unique in the phenomena is saved." 24 However, 
in this unity a dialectic appears in which origin and end become 
identified and transform each other. The origin is not in this case 
a provenance (Entstehung), but rather something like an 
Euphiinomenon in the Goethian sense, a "phenomenon of origin" 
in which "is shaped the figure where ideas always reconfront the 
world of history until that world lies down, terminated in the 
totality of its history. "25 Likewise, the end is not a simple cessation, 
but rather a totality ("The being which is in question in 
philosophy," according to Benjamin, "is not satisfied with the 
phenomenon but only with the consummation of its history"). In 
the idea, the phenomenon finishes itself off, "it becomes that 
which was not: totality." Because of this, the power of the idea 
does not invest the sphere of facts, "but refers to their prehistory 
and posthistory," to their origin and their completed totality. 
Like the origin, the language of names is not, then, an initial 
chronological point, just as the messianic end of languages, the 
universal language of redeemed humanity, is not a simple 
chronological cessation. Together they constitute the two faces of 
a single "idea of language" which the 1916 and 1921 essays on 
the task of the translator presented separately . 
If, at this point, we return to the text with which we began, 
we understand in what sense Benjamin stated that the universal 
language of redeemed humanity which is the same as its history, 
is "the very idea of a universally comprehended prose, just as the 
language of birds is comprehended by the children born on Sun-
day." The universal language in question here can only be, for 
Benjamin-we must acknowledge both the audacity and the coher-
ence of this theory-the idea of language, that is, not an ideal (in 
the neo-Kantian sense) but the very Platonic idea of language which 
saves and contains in itself all languages and which an enigmatic 
Aristotelian fragment describes as "a middle, a mediator between 
prose and poetry." For Benjamin, it coincides, however, with the 
very idea of prose, according to the notion of a prosaic nucleus 
in every linguistic formation which he expressed in his university 
thesis on the Romantic conception of criticism. 
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An observation made by Valery in an article in the Encyclopedie 
Franraise struck Benjamin while he was working on an essay for 
the Narratore, and he transcribed it in his notes: "The essence of 
prose is to perish, that is, to be understood, to be dissolved, 
destroyed with no chance of return, totally substituted by the 
image or the impulse." Inasmuch as it has reached its own limit 
of transparency, inasmuch as it says and means only itself, the 
word restored to the idea dissolves immediately. It is "pure his-
tory," a history without grammar or tradition which knows no 
past or repetition, but which rests only on its never having been. 
It is that which, in every historical language, continually pro-
nounces itself and comes about not as a presupposed unsayable, 
but as the never said which nourishes the life of the language. It 
is truly the "eternal lamp" which, in a fragment from the same 
period during which Benjamin was working out his concept of 
history, he describes as the image of a "pure historical essence": 
the "flame which lights up on the final day and feeds on all that 
has never happened among men. "26 The idea of language is the 
language which no longer presupposes any other language, and 
which, having burned within itself every presupposition and 
name, has nothing more to say, but, simply, speaks. 
In this perfect transparency of language where every distinc-
tion between the field of names and signifying words, between the 
intended and the said, is leveled, it seems truly as if languages-
and with them all human culture-have reached their messianic 
end. But this applies only within a determined concept of language 
and a determined concept of culture: the familiar elements which 
serve as the foundation for all evolution and historic tradition 
developing from the immedicable split between the thing to be 
transmitted and the act of transmission, between names and 
words, and which guaranteed, at this price, the infinity and con-
tinuity of the historical (as well as the linguistic) process. 
Benjamin expressed himself without hesitation against this 
conception when he wrote that the past should be saved, not so 
much from the oblivion and distortion in which it is held, but 
"from a determined mode of tradition," and that "the manner in 
which the past is read as an inheritance is more unspeakable than 
its potential disappearance." Or, again, that "the history of culture 
increases the weight of the treasures which burden the shoulders 
of mankind. But we lack the strength to shake them from our 
backs and so we take them by the hand." 
Here, instead, humanity has truly taken by the hand its "trea-
sures": its language and history, its language history, to be more 
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precise. The split within the field of language which formed the 
base for the inextricable link between language and history-and 
at the same time guaranteed their asymptotic impossibility of re-
conciliation-is closed up to leave space for a perfect identification 
of language and history, of praxis and word. 
For this, universal history knows no past to transmit, but it 
is the world of an "integral actuality." 
Language here disappears as an autonomous category. It is 
impossible to develop a distinct image of it or to imprison it in 
any writing: men no longer write their language, but they act it 
out like a celebration without rites. They understand each other 
"as the children born on Sunday understand the language of 
birds." 
It is certainly difficult to imagine a human community and 
human language which no longer refer to any unsayable founda-
tion, are no longer destined for an infinite handing down, and in 
which words are no longer distinguished from any other human 
practice. But this, and nothing less, is what remains to be thought 
out by anyone concerned with the problem at this level. Perhaps 
what we face is something so simple that we lack the courage to 
think it, that courage, as Wittgenstein said, which only thought 
can summon. 
That courage which directed Hegel, at the end of the Science 
of Logic, to formulate the absolute idea as "the originary word, 
which is an utterance, but such that as utterance, it is immediately 
lost again while it exists." 
That same courage which underlies the prose of a story by a 
great Italian writer of the twentieth century: Antonio Delfini. In 
this story Delfini-according to a model which is as old as the 
origins of Italian poetry, the romances of the troubadours, and 
Dante-presents a woman as object of desire who is also a lan-
guage. However, this language is unknown, totally unfamiliar, 
and it does not exist anywhere: the Basque language. Souvenir of 
Basque is the title of these stories: that is, if my reading is correct, the 
memory of an unknown language is desired beyond all other loves. 
If we wanted to express the memory of this language, Delfini 
writes, "we could not say anything that had anything to say." 
We would have to speak without having anything to say. In fact, 
this memory is the end of all memory. Delfini writes: 
We must never remember, if it is true that one day or another we 
have to stop this sighing and start running, and stay together as 
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if it were the most natural thing in the world. All of my prayers, 
when I found myself alone in the past few months, were directed 
towards one hope: Lord, make the day come when I will no longer 
remember Isabella. I would like to be so close to her that no matter 
how hard I tried I would not even be able to conjure up her image. 
In this end of memory, in this unheard of proximity between man 
and his language where there is no more room for any image, 
letter, or grammar, we should perhaps see the true figure of the 
universal language of humanity. And this language, this proxim-
ity, are, Delfini writes, "the most natural thing in the world." 
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